Factors affecting the student evaluation of teaching scores: evidence from panel data estimation by Andrade, Eduardo de Carvalho & Rocha, Bruno de Paula
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.1, p. 129-150, jan.-mar. 2012
ISSN 0101-4161
Factors Affecting the Student Evaluation of Teaching 
Scores: Evidence from Panel Data Estimation♦
Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade 
Professor Associado do Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa (Inper)
Endereço para contato: Rua Quatá 300, 4o. andar - São Paulo - CEP: 04546-042 
E-mail: eduardo.andrade@insper.edu.br
Bruno de Paula Rocha
Professor Adjunto da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)                                      
Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento de Minas Gerais (CEDEPLAR)                                                               
Endereço para contato: Av. Antônio Carlos, 6627, Belo Horizonte - Brazil - CEP: 31270-901                                 
E-mail: brunor@cedeplar.ufmg.br
Recebido em 11 de março de 2011. Aceito em 14 de dezembro de 2011.
Abstract
We use a random-effects model to find the factors that affect the student evaluation of 
teaching (SET) scores. Dataset covers 6 semesters, 496 undergraduate courses related 
to 101 instructors and 89 disciplines. Our empirical findings are: (i) the class size affects 
negatively the SET score; (ii) instructors with more experience are better evaluated, 
but these gains reduce over time; (iii) participating in training programs, designed to 
improve the quality of teaching, did not increase the SET scores; (iv) instructors seem 
to be able to marginally ‘buy’ a better evaluation by inflating students’ grade. Finally, 
there are significant changes in the rankings when we adjust the SET score to eliminate 
the effects of variables beyond instructors’ control. Despite these changes, they are 
not statistically significant.
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Resumo
Este trabalho emprega um modelo de efeitos aleatórios para estimar os principais fatores 
determinantes na avaliação de professores por estudantes. Os dados compreendem 
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496 cursos na graduação, relacionados a 101 diferentes professores e 89 disciplinas, 
durante 6 semestres letivos. Os principais resultados obtidos são: (i) o tamanho das 
salas de aula afeta negativamente a nota recebida pelo professor; (ii) professores mais 
experientes são mais bem avaliados, mas estes ganhos são decrescentes ao longo do 
tempo; (iii) a participação em programas de treinamento, desenhados para melhorar a 
qualidade do ensino, não afetam as notas recebidas pelos professores; (iv) a avaliação 
recebida pelos professores é marginalmente influenciada pela nota dada aos alunos 
durante o curso. Finalmente, os dados mostram mudanças significativas no ranking 
dos professores, quando são feitos ajustes para eliminar os efeitos de variáveis fora 
do controle dos professores. Entretanto, estas mudanças não são estatisticamente 
significativas.
Palavras-Chave
avaliação de professores, modelo de efeitos aleatórios, ensino de graduação, classifi-
cação de professores
1. Introduction
In several higher education institutions, it is common that students 
evaluate their professors in the end of the courses.1 The results of 
the student evaluation of teaching (SET) are considered as an ins-
trument to assess the quality of an instructor’s teaching and are used 
by these institutions for purposes of promotion of the instructors.2 
Reflecting the importance of this topic for professors and univer-
sities’ managers, there is a vast literature on the factors that affect 
the SET scores.3
A question of fundamental importance is if the instrument SET is 
appropriate for the purpose of assessing the quality of an instructor’s 
teaching and, as a consequence, its use for deciding the instructor’s 
promotion. In particular, the SET can be distorted in some undesi-
rable ways. For example, an instructor may be able to ‘buy’ a better 
evaluation by inflating students’ grades or the SET can be affected 
by variables beyond the instructor’s control (such as age, sex or class 
size). When a higher education institution’s manager does not take 
into consideration these possible effects, an instructor may be pro-
1  For example, Becker and Watts (1999) show that this is the case for most departments of 
economics in the United States.
2 Many studies have analyzed if higher SET scores in fact mean that the teaching quality is great-
er. The results are mixed. See, for example, Soper (1973) and Gramlich and Greenlee (1993). 
3 For a review of the literature, see McPherson et al. (2007).
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moted or not unfairly. This paper’s objective is to examine empiri-
cally such possible effects and to present an alternative to eliminate 
these possible distortions in order to maintain the usefulness of the 
SET for purposes of promotion.
This paper takes advantage of a new large panel data from Insper 
(a private higher education institution) with six semesters for the 
period from the second semester of 2005 to the first semester of 
2008, encompassing 496 undergraduate courses taught by 101 ins-
tructors in 89 different disciplines. We use a random-effects model 
estimated with feasible generalized least squares to examine the 
effects of instructor-specific time-invariant characteristics as well as 
to control for unobservable characteristics of individual instructors. 
In these regards, the closest papers to this one in the literature are 
McPherson (2006) and McPherson et al. (2007). To our knowledge, 
this is the first time that such analysis is performed using data from 
a Brazilian higher education institution (HEI).
We find robust empirical evidence that some course’s, instructor’s 
and student’s characteristics can affect the SET scores. The coeffi-
cients of the variables related to the instructor training programs 
though were not significant. Instructors seem to be able to margi-
nally ‘buy’ a better evaluation by inflating student’s grade. Other 
results found in the literature are also obtained here: the class size 
affects negatively the SET score and instructors with more experien-
ce are better evaluated, but these gains reduce over time. 
Furthermore, we construct different instructors’ rankings by adjus-
ting the SET scores, in order to eliminate either the possible effects 
of instructors’ manipulation through grade inflation or the effects 
of variables beyond the instructor’s control. There are significant 
changes in the rankings when we adjust the SET score to elimina-
te the effects of variables beyond instructors’ control. Nonetheless, 
when constructing the 95% percentage confidence interval of the 
predicted SET scores, we find that these changes are not statistically 
significant.
This paper has five sections including this introduction. In the next 
section, we present the data and the methodology employed in the 
analysis. The results are presented and discussed in section 3. In 
section 4, we analyze how the instructors’ ranking changes when we 
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adjust the SET scores in order to eliminate either the possibility of 
instructor’s manipulation through grade inflation or the effects of va-
riables beyond the instructor’s control. The last section concludes.
2. Methodology and Data
We obtained the data from Insper’s (Institute of Education and 
Research) Academic Records Office. The data covered six semesters 
for the period from the second semester of 2005 to the first semes-
ter of 2008. It comprises 496 undergraduate courses offered during 
this period, taught by 101 different instructors. 63 observations were 
excluded from the sample, or 12,7% of the total, for three reasons: 
(i) the instructor taught only one time at the institution (32 observa-
tions in the original sample), (ii) the fraction of students enrolled in 
the class that answer the SET form was equal to 0% (3 observations) 
or greater than 100% (14 observations) and (iii) the number of stu-
dents enrolled in class was smaller than 12 (25 observations).
It is important to point out that there are instructors who taught du-
ring the period analyzed more than one course in the same semester. 
This fact precludes the use of panel data techniques when using the 
instructor as the unity of analysis. In order to circumvent this pro-
blem, we consider the pair instructor/course as the unit of analysis. 
When the unity instructor/course occurred more than once in the 
same semester, the information related to this unity of observation 
was averaged. When averaged, the number of observations is equal 
to 363 and there are 130 pairs instructor/course.
There are two important characteristics of the data. The first is that 
Insper’s students in each field (business or economics) must take the 
same courses in the first three of the four years of courses necessary 
to obtain the degree. Hence, in the first three years, they cannot 
choose either the instructor or the class, that is, they have to take 
the options offered. In the last year, students can select different 
course/instructor from the pool of offered elective disciplines. We 
conducted an F test to check if it is appropriate to pool together 
mandatory and elective courses.4 The F-statistic is 25.71 (19 degrees 
of freedom) which is not significant at the usual level of significan-
4  Following McPheerson et al. (2007), we tested the equality of parameters in mandatory and 
elective disciplines using specification in column 1 in Table 2 (see the appendix).
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ce. It indicates that it is valid to pool the two groups of courses. 
Therefore, we conduct the empirical analysis combining data from 
both types of courses. The second characteristic is that, in the first 
three semesters, the courses are the same for students in the busi-
ness or economics field and they are offered as joint courses. In this 
case, students cannot choose the instructor/class but are allocated by 
the institution, which mix economic and business students.
Insper hires individuals other than the instructors to distribute SET 
forms without announcement beforehand two times during the se-
mester. They occur right before the mid-term and final exams. In 
our analysis, we use only the results obtained in the last evaluation. 
In this research, we use two dependent variables. The first one is 
the average of all answers in the SET form (hereafter referred as 
EVAL1), which is the variable used by the institution to evaluate the 
quality of instructor’s teaching for purposes of promotion. EVAL1 
ranges from 1 to 4, where a higher value indicates a better evalua-
tion. The average score for EVAL1 for all courses was 3.32 and the 
minimum and maximum value were, respectively, 1.9 and 3.9. In 
Table 1 of the appendix, we present the descriptive statistics.
The second dependent variable (EVAL2) is calculated based on the 
answer to the following question, which is not used in the computa-
tion of EVAL1: “Considering the overall course and the instructor’s 
performance, would you recommend this course with this instructor 
to a colleague?” The possible answers are no (value 1) or yes (value 
2). EVAL2 is the average response and it obviously ranges from 1 to 
2, where the closer is to 2 the better is the evaluation. The average 
value for EVAL2 for all courses was 1.84 and the minimum and 
maximum value were, respectively, 1.08 and 2.
Following the literature, we consider three groups of variables that 
can affect the SET score. They are related to the characteristics of 
the students, courses and instructors.
With respect to instructor’s characteristics, we use several explana-
tory variables. The first two are related to instructor training pro-
grams. One is a dummy variable (CPCL) equal to 1 if the instructor 
had taken part in the Colloquium on Participant-Centered Learning 
at the Harvard Business School5 and 0 otherwise. This training pro-
5  For more details on this program, see http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/gcpcl/.
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gram aims to help instructors to improve their effectiveness by le-
arning from their teaching. The expected sign of this variable is 
positive as instructors learn new techniques and ways to improve 
their teaching. 17.6% of all instructors at Insper had taken part in 
this program. Another dummy variable is (PAAP), which is equal 
to 1 if the instructor had taken part in the PAAP program6 and 0 
otherwise. The PAAP program is one in which an instructor attends 
another instructor’s class with the objective to identify problems, 
provide recommendations and suggestions in order to improve the 
teaching quality. Therefore, the expected sign of this variable is po-
sitive. 20.8% of all instructors had participated in this program. 
We also control for the instructor’s schooling. A dummy varia-
ble (PHD) is equal to 1 if the instructor has a PhD degree and 
0 otherwise. The expected sign of this variable is positive as the 
instructor’s knowledge and human capital increase with education. 
76.2% of all instructors at Insper have a PhD degree. The others 
either have a master degree or a professional degree such as an 
MBA.
Another control variable is a dummy (GENDER) equal to 1 to male 
instructors and 0 otherwise. 82.2% of all instructors are male. It 
may exists some gender bias in the evaluation process, for example, 
due to discrimination or a different perception by the students of 
male vis-à-vis female instructor,7 which makes unclear the sign of 
its coefficient. Another dummy variable is (FULL), which is equal 
to 1 or 0 if the instructor is, respectively, a full-time or part-time 
professor. The fraction of full-time professors is 27%. The sign of its 
coefficient is uncertain. Both types of instructors have other respon-
sibilities rather than teaching.
One additional explanatory variable is the number of semesters 
teaching at Insper (EXP). The average number is equal to 3.6. This 
variable is a proxy for teaching experience, as we do not have the 
information of how long the instructor teaches at other institutions. 
The expected sign of its coefficient is positive as more experience 
in the classroom contributes to an increase in the teaching quality. 
In particular, as this variable counts only the number of semesters 
6  PAAP stands for “professor attending another professor’s class” in Portuguese.
7  Hamermesh and Parker (2005) indicate that beauty perception affects the SET score and 
Aits effect differs by instructor gender.
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teaching at Insper, it may capture the instructor’s adaptability to 
the institution’s environment and student body. We also check if 
this learning gain reduces over time by the introduction of the EXP 
squared. The last variable is the instructor’s age (AGE). The average 
age is 39.6 years old. Controlling for experience, the expected sign 
of its coefficient is negative due to different reasons: human capital 
depreciation, students’ bias in favor of younger instructors and invol-
vement in other activities rather than teaching such as administrative 
duties in the case of full-time professors.8 We also check if the AGE 
squared is significant.
With respect to students’ characteristics in each class, we use three 
explanatory variables. The first one is the actual average grade 
(GRADE). It ranges from 0 to 10 and its average score is 6.44, with 
minimum 2 and maximum 8.7. This variable may test the possibility 
that instructors can “buy” a better evaluation by giving higher gra-
des.9 Under this possibility, its coefficient is expected to be positive. 
As we do not have the average expected grade, which is more fre-
quently used in the literature, this is the alternative employed.10,11 
The second variable is the fraction of students enrolled in class 
that answer the SET form (PRESP). The average value of PRESP 
is 60.8%. The expected sign of its coefficient is not clear. A high 
percentage of response may lead to lower SET scores either because 
the students are poorly satisfied with the instructors’ performance 
and want to show their lack of appreciation or because a high frac-
tion of low performing students answer the evaluation. The reverse 
may occur if a high percentage of response is indicative of student 
interest. The third variable is the fraction of female students in class 
(PFEM). The average value of PFEM is 27.9%. Again, the sign of its 
coefficient is unclear. The gender composition may affect the SET 
scores if male and female students have different standards when 
evaluating their instructors. 
8  See discussion in McPherson et al. (2007).
9  This effect is of particular interest in the literature. See survey about this topic in McPherQASSDDDDD                SSSSSS
SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS son et al. (2007).
10   Isely and Sing (2005) consider the relevant variable the difference between expected grade 
Aand the grades that students are used to receive. McPherson et al. (2007) argue that it is 
AAmore appropriate to use the expected grade. 
11  In the literature, there is some indication that the grade variable may be endogenous. See 
Afor example Seiver (1983) and Nelson and Lynch (1984). We return to this point in the 
Anext section.
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With respect to the courses’ characteristics, we use several expla-
natory variables. The first one is the number of students enrolled 
in class at the beginning of the semester (CSIZE). The sign of its 
coefficient is likely to be negative as the instructor provides less 
attention to any particular student the greater the class size and 
should be “penalized” by the students in the SET evaluation. CSIZE 
ranges from 13 to 115, and its average value is 56.5. Then, we use a 
dummy variable (MAND) equal to 1 if the course is mandatory and 
0 otherwise. The percentage of mandatory courses in the sample is 
84.5%.  One should expect instructors teaching elective courses to 
be better evaluated by the students as the latter had the option to 
choose the course/instructor. Finally, we use a set of dummy varia-
bles to indicate whether the course belongs to the business degree 
(BUS) (21.9% of the total), to the economics degree (ECON) (17.8% 
of the total) or is a joint one (JOINT) (60.3%). The sign of their co-
efficients are unclear. The composition of the student body in class 
may affect the SET scores if economics and business students have 
different standards when evaluating their instructors.
We have a panel data and we consider two types of models, either 
a fixed-effect or a random-effects one. Both models control for the 
unobservable characteristics of the pairs instructor/course and time 
(from the 2nd semester of 2005 until 1st the semester of 2008). 
We test which model is the most appropriate. Hausman test for 
the sample indicates that the unobserved instructors’ heterogeneity 
can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, 
mentioned above, included in the analysis. The chi-square statistic 
is 8.84 (19 degrees of freedom), which is insignificant at any con-
ventional level.12 
Therefore, we concentrate the analysis in the results when the ran-
dom-effects model is used, which is characterized by the following 
formulation:
 Yit = α + ui + γt + Xitβ + εit,             
where: Yit is the dependent variable (EVAL1 or EVAL2) of the 
pair instructor/course ‘i’ in semester ‘t’; α is a constant; ui is the 
pair instructor/course specific effect; γt is the semester-speci-
fic effect; Xit is a vector that includes all the explanatory varia-
12   We have conducted the test using specification in column 1in Table 2 (see the appendix).
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bles mentioned above; β is a vector with the coefficients of inte-
rest; and εit is the error term and it is assumed to be well-behaved. 
3. Results
In this section, we present the evidence of which factors affect the 
SET score. Table 2 in the appendix reports the estimation results 
using different specifications of the model. In column 1, we use the 
variable EVAL1 as the dependent variable and all the explanatory 
variables mentioned in the previous section, without the quadratic 
terms.
Before proceeding with the results, it is important to note that the 
variable EVAL1 is not truncated neither from below nor from above. 
It ranges from 1 to 4 and, as one can see in Table 1, in our sample, 
its minimum value is 1.9 and its maximum value is 3.9. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to use the FGLS econometric technique.  
The results in column 1 indicate the following. With respect to the 
students’ characteristics, there is only one that affects EVAL1: the 
GRADE. Hence, there is evidence that an instructor may be able to 
“buy” a better evaluation by inflating the students’ grade. The coef-
ficient of the variable GRADE is positive and significantly different 
from zero, but small. One point increase in GRADE in the 0-10 
scale leads to an increase in the SET scores of 0.09 point. To give a 
better idea of this impact, consider two identical average classes with 
the exception of their average grades: one has the average grade of all 
classes13 (6.47) and another has a grade one standard deviation lower 
(5.48). The instructor’s SET score in latter would be 2.7% smaller 
than the former.14
There is no indication that male and female students have different 
standards when evaluating instructors, as the coefficient of the varia-
ble PFEM is not statistically different from zero. Finally, the fraction 
of students enrolled in the class that answer the SET form (PRESP) 
also is not relevant to explain the dependent variable EVAL1.
13   The values in these comparisons are related to the adjusted sample for the pair instructor/
Acourse.
14    As in McPherson et al. (2007), we employ a Hausman test (available from the authors), and 
Awe do not find evidence of endogeneity on the grade variable.
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With respect to the courses’ characteristics, the results are the follo-
wing. The greater the number of students in class, the lower is the 
SET grade. In other words, the sign of the CSIZE’s coefficient is 
negative and significantly different from zero. An additional student 
in class reduces the SET score in 0.003 point. To understand this 
effect better, consider two identical average classes with the excep-
tion of their sizes: one has 54.7 students in class (average number 
for all classes) and another has one standard deviation higher (75.64 
students). The instructor’s SET score in the latter would be 2% bi-
gger than the former. 
One can argue that it may have an endogeneity problem related to 
the class size, for example, in the case that students choose the cour-
ses taught by the best instructors. In order to check this possibility, 
we restrict our sample to the mandatory courses, the ones taught 
in the first three years of the four years courses of economics and 
business. The reason is that students cannot choose instructors or 
courses in the first three years of their courses. They are assigned 
by the institution. When we re-do the analysis using this restricted 
sample, the results do not change.15
There is no difference in terms of evaluation by students if the cour-
se is mandatory or elective. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
MAND is not statistically different from zero. This is a surprising 
result as one should expect students to evaluate better an instructor 
that he can choose. Finally, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
JOINT is positive and significantly different from zero. It indicates 
that the composition of the student body affects the SET score. In 
particular, classes with economics and business students evaluate 
better the instructors relatively to classes with only economics stu-
dents. With respect to the instructors’ characteristics, some variables 
are not statistically significant in the regression in column 1. The 
first one is the GENDER variable. There is no indication of discri-
mination or difference in perception with respect to the instructor’s 
gender by the students. The second one is the status as full-time 
professor or the dummy variable FULL. This result is not surprising 
given that both types of instructors have other duties rather than 
teaching that should interfere in the same way their time allocation 
to class preparation. The coefficients of the variables AGE and PhD 
15  These results are available under request. We thank one of the referees for pointing out this 
possible endogenous problem.
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are not statistically significant, as their expected signs were, respec-
tively, negative and positive, as discussed in the previous section. 
The coefficients of the two variables related to the training programs 
(PAAP and CPCL) are also not significantly different from zero. 
That is, there is no indication that students evaluate better the ins-
tructors who have passed by these two types of training programs. 
These are surprising results, as indicated by the discussion in the 
previous section. It is important to point out that, as the link be-
tween quality of teaching and SET scores is not clear, these results 
do not necessarily indicate that these programs are not capable of 
improving the quality of the instructors’ class.
Depending on the way that instructors are selected to participate in 
both training programs (PAAP or CPCL), it could create an endoge-
neity problem. For example, if instructors with relatively lower SET 
scores are the ones selected to take part in the programs, then the 
dependent variable affects the dummy variables related to the varia-
bles PAAP and CPCL. We did not find a reasonable way to correct 
this potential problem. The difficulties are the following. One the 
one hand, there is no written policy that indicates how the instruc-
tors are actually selected into the programs. One the other hand, 
it is hard to find instrumental variables in this case, an exogenous 
variable with respect to the dependent variable and correlated with 
the variables PAAP and CPCL. In order to test the robustness of the 
other results in the regression, we estimated the models without the 
variables PAAP and CPCL and found that the other coefficients and 
its significance do not change.16
One variable related to the instructors’ characteristics affects the 
SET scores. As expected, the longer the instructors’ experience te-
aching at Insper, the greater is their evaluations. In other words, 
the coefficient of the variable EXP is positive and significantly di-
fferent from zero. One additional semester of experience leads to 
an increase in the evaluation by 0.03 point. An example illustrates 
this effect. Consider two classes identical in all aspects but the ins-
tructors’ experience. In the first one, the instructor has 3.4 semes-
ters of experience, the average of all classes. In the second one, the 
instructor has one standard deviation lower than the average (0.9 
16   These results are available under request. We thank one of the referees for pointing out this 
Apossible endogenous problem.
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semester). The instructor’s SET score in former and the latter would 
be, respectively, equal to 3.3 and 3.2 points.
In column 2 in Table 2, we present a different specification of the 
random-effects model. It differs from the first column by the fact 
that there is one additional explanatory variable. It is the quadratic 
term of the variable EXP, which is negative and significantly diffe-
rent from zero.  The coefficient of the variable EXP remains positive 
and significant. In other words, the first and second derivatives of 
the EVAL1 with respect to EXP are, respectively, positive and nega-
tive. Combining these two results, the empirical evidence suggests 
that instructors with more experience are better evaluated by the 
students but these gains reduce over time. There are no qualitative 
changes in the results under this new specification.
We tried some different specifications to the model in column 2. 
First, we introduced the quadratic terms of the variables CSIZE and 
AGE, but their coefficients were not significantly different from 
zero. Second, we included an interaction term between GENDER 
and PFEM to check if classes with a higher fraction of female stu-
dents evaluate female instructors differently. We found no evidence 
of this effect. Third, as AGE and EXP are somewhat correlated, we 
run regressions with each variable separately but the results do not 
change. Finally, we extracted from the regression the variables EXP 
and its quadratic term and introduced the term AGE and its qua-
dratic term. The idea behind this last change is that “AGE variables” 
may better reflect the professional experience than the “EXP vari-
ables”. We do not find that the coefficients of the “AGE variables” 
to be significantly different from zero.17
Specifications in columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 are the same as in, 
respectively, columns 1 and 2. The only difference is that we use 
instead the dependent variable EVAL2.18 Quantitatively speaking, 
the new results are not very different with some exceptions. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable JOINT is not statistically diffe-
rent from zero. Moreover, the coefficients of the variables GRADE 
and CSIZE are roughly, respectively, two and three times greater 
when the dependent variable is EVAL1. In fact, the coefficient of the 
17   These results of these different specifications are available from the authors under request.
18   The variable EVAL2 is truncated from the right, as there are some instructors who receive 
Athe maximum possible score 2. However, the results do not change when we eliminate 
Athese observations from the sample.
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variable CSIZE is not statistically different from zero in the model 
in column 3.  
4. Rankings
The analysis in the previous section indicates that several factors 
affect the SET scores. Among these factors are variables under the 
control of the instructor, such as GRADE, or not, such as EXP and 
CSIZE. As a consequence, an instructor can receive a better evalu-
ation either by manipulating his score through grade inflation or by 
the effects of variables that are beyond his control. In both cases, 
comparison of instructors without controlling for these possibilities 
may not be fair. In order to take into consideration these possibilities 
and adjust the SET scores accordingly, we construct three different 
rankings.19 They are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
The benchmark case (ranking 1) is in Table 3. To obtain this first 
ranking, we do the following. We obtain the predicted SET score 
for each instructor for every time that he teaches a course by cal-
culating the regression fitted value, using the estimated coefficients 
in column 2 in Table 2 and given the explanatory variables for each 
instructor. Note that this predicted value is not influenced by the 
instructor-specific random-effects. The results reported are the ave-
rage fitted values over all semesters. 
The second ranking is reported in Table 4. In this one, the proce-
dure is the same as the one used to produce the benchmark case, 
with one exception. We replace the actual value of the explanatory 
variable GRADE of each instructor every time he teaches a course 
by the mean GRADE of the sample. Again, the reported results are 
the average fitted values over all semesters. By adjusting the ranking 
in this way, we eliminate the effects on the SET score of possible 
manipulation by the instructor through the grade inflation.
Comparison between rankings 1 and 2 indicates that they are very 
similar. Despite of the possibility of being able to “buy” higher sco-
res by inflating students’ grade, instructors in general are not able 
to change dramatically their positions in the ranking. The most sig-
nificant change occurred with instructor I59 that moved from po-
19   For similar adjustments in the literature, see Mason et al. (1995) and McPherson (2006).
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sition 59 in the benchmark ranking to position 51 in ranking 2. In 
addition, instructor (I26) and instructors (I14, I36 and I51) moved 
down, respectively, 6 and 5 positions and instructor I21 moved up 
five positions.
The third ranking is reported in Table 4. Again, they are constructed 
in the same way as the benchmark case but with two exceptions. For 
each instructor and every time he teaches a course, we replace the 
actual values of two explanatory variables in the regression, CSIZE 
and EXP, by their respectively average values in the sample. The new 
ranking is formed by the average fitted values over all semesters. 
With these two adjustments, we basically eliminate the effects of 
variables beyond the instructor’s control.
Rankings 1 and 3 have their similarities. For example, nine out of 
the ten top instructors in ranking 1 are also in the top ten positions 
in ranking 2. However, the differences between rankings 1 and 3 
are greater than the ones between rankings 1 and 2. One indicator 
illustrates this fact. The sum of the absolute changes in positions of 
all instructors when one compares rankings 1 and 2 is equal to 104. 
This statistic is equal to 284 when the comparison is made between 
rankings 1 and 3. In fact, there are some dramatic changes in some 
instructors’ positions in ranking 3 vis-à-vis ranking 1. For example, 
instructor I34 moves down 21 positions when one eliminates the 
effects of the variables CSIZE and EXP, which are not in his control. 
In contrast, instructors I31 and I40 move up, respectively, 14 and 
13 positions. 
We apply a more robust test to compare the rankings. We use the 
Wilcoxon Two Sample Test,20 which is a nonparametric approach 
to check the null hypothesis of equality in the distributions behind 
two rankings. When comparing ranking 1 (the benchmark case) with 
ranking 2, one cannot reject the null hypothesis. The test p-value 
is equal to 0.2105. However, when comparing rankings 1 and 3, 
the null hypothesis is rejected at 5%, with the test p-value equal to 
0.0121. These results are in line with the ones obtained above by 
simply comparing the positions of the instructors between rankings: 
rankings 1 and 2 are similar, whereas rankings 1 and 3 are not.
20   For more details, see Wilcoxon (1945).
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Tables 3 and 4 also show the predicted SET scores for all instructors 
in all three rankings with their respective 95% confidence interval. 
Despite the changes in positions in ranking 2 and in particular in 
ranking 3 with respect to ranking 1, the SET scores in all three 
rankings for all instructors are not statistically different.21 
The last point we want to address is the following. Suppose that an 
institution establishes a threshold SET score, say 3.4,22 such that 
instructors with scores greater or equal than this number are con-
sidered as having performed an outstanding job with important in-
fluences in their promotion status. A comparison of the predicted 
scores in rankings 1 and 2 suggests the following. No instructor who 
receives a score below 3.4 in ranking 1 (instructors I24 to I69) would 
pass this threshold in ranking 2, when the possibility of manipulating 
the score through grade inflation is taken into account and elimi-
nated. At the same time, only instructor I23, who receives a score 
above 3.4 in ranking 1 (instructors I1 to I23), would have his score 
reduced to a level below to this threshold in ranking 2.
However, there are instructors with predicted scores below 3.4 
(from instructor I23 with 3.39 to instructor I44 with 3.24 in ranking 
2 in Table 4) whose value is not statistically different from 3.4, using 
the 95% confidence interval. Therefore, the use of the threshold 3.4 
as the basis for promotion, without considering adjustments, should 
be used with cautious.
5. Conclusions
We estimated the factors that affect the SET scores, using a large 
panel data and a random-effects model in which it was possible to 
control for unobserved characteristics of the instructors as well as 
time-invariant ones. The results indicate that some variables influ-
ence the evaluation. They also seem robust to different specifica-
tions of the model.
There is evidence that an instructor may be able to ‘buy’ a bet-
ter evaluation by inflating students’ grade, though the effect is not 
21   We also calculated two different rankings, respectively, controlling for the variables CSIZE 
Aand EXP separately. They are also not statistically different from ranking 1. 
22   This value is the threshold value at Insper. 
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strong. As expected, the greater the number of students in class, the 
lower is the SET score. Moreover, instructors with more semesters 
of experience teaching at the institution are better evaluated by the 
students but these gains reduce over time. In addition, it is somehow 
surprising that the instructor’s age and schooling do not affect the 
way students evaluate him. 
Another result is the evidence that instructors who participated in 
training programs, designed to improve the quality of teaching, do 
not receive higher SET scores. One cannot easily conclude from 
these results that these programs are not capable of improving the 
quality of the instructors’ class. The reason is that the link between 
quality and effectiveness of teaching and SET scores are not clear.
We construct different instructors’ rankings by adjusting the SET 
scores, in order to eliminate either the possible manipulation by the 
instructor through grade inflation or the effects of variables beyond 
the instructor’s control. There are significant changes in the rankings 
when we adjust the SET score to eliminate the effects of variables 
beyond instructors’ control. Nonetheless, when constructing the 95% 
percentage confidence interval of the predicted SET scores, we find 
that these changes are not statistically significant. One important 
policy implication is that the use of a given threshold SET score as 
the basis for promotion, without considering adjustments, should be 
used with cautious.
Finally, our qualitative results are very similar to the ones obtained 
in the closest papers to ours, McPherson (2006) and McPherson et 
al. (2007): instructors seem to be able to ‘buy’ better evaluation 
scores, class size and experience seem to affect the instructors SET 
scores and it is important to adjust the instructors’ ranking. Hence, 
different social and cultural environments (higher education insti-
tutions in Brazil and the US) did not seem to affect the instructors’ 
and students’ behaviors.
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Appendix
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SET Variables
EVAL1 433 3.3 0.3 1.9 3.9
EVAL2 433 1.8 0.2 1.1 2.0
Student’s Characteristics
GRADE 433 6.4 1.0 2.0 8.7
PRESP 433 60.8% 16.4% 8.0% 93.6%
PFEM 433 27.9% 7.9% 6.8% 52.5%
Courses’ Characteristics
CSIZE 433 56.5 20.7 13.0 115.0
MAND 433 84.5% 36.2% 0.0% 100.0%
BUS 433 21.9% 41.4% 0.0% 100.0%
ECON 433 17.8% 38.3% 0.0% 100.0%
JOINT 433 60.3% 49.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Instructors’ Characteristics
GENDER 433 82.2% 38.3% 0.0% 100.0%
FULL 433 27.0% 44.5% 0.0% 100.0%
EXP 433 3.6 2.4 0.0 14.4
AGE 433 39.6 8.0 24.9 64.3
PHD 433 76.2% 42.6% 0 1
PAAP 433 20.8% 40.6% 0 1
CPCL 433 17.6% 38.1% 0 1
Table 2 - Random-Effects’ FGLS Estimates 1
Dependent Variable
Explanatory variables EVAL1 EVAL1 EVAL2 EVAL2
Student’s Characteristics
GRADE 0.091*** 0.078*** 0.049*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004)
PRESP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.752) (0.919) (0.922) (0.846)
PFEM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.627) (0.610) (0.343) (0.331)
Courses’ Characteristics
CSIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.191) (0.096)
MAND 0.058 0.056 0.001 0.000
(0.433) (0.449) (0.982) (0.993)
BUS 0.052 0.060 0.032 0.037
(0.580) (0.522) (0.518) (0.443)
JOINT 0.150* 0.158** 0.046 0.052
(0.066) (0.050) (0.251) (0.179)
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Instructors’ Characteristics
GENDER 0.066 0.074 0.036 0.042
(0.372) (0.306) (0.388) (0.302)
FULL -0.032 0.006 -0.032 -0.005
(0.650) (0.929) (0.375) (0.892)
EXP 0.028** 0.080*** 0.019** 0.056***
(0.036) (0.002) (0.021) (0.000)
EXP2 -0.005** -0.004***
(0.011) (0.004)
AGE -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.972) (0.713) (0516) (0.947)
PHD 0.006 -0.030 0.026 -0.001
(0.931) (0.662) (0.527) (0.988)
PAAP -0.036 -0.006 -0.060 -0.037
(0.587) (0.934) (0.107) (0.330)
CPCL -0.010 -0.012 -0.040 -0.041
(0.868) (0.849) (0.238) (0.228)
Number of obs. 363 363 363 363
Wald chi2 (d.f.) 87.32 92.12 42.41 53.89
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 overall 0.159 0.206 0.1302 0.202
1  The equations include time dummies for each semester between 2nd semester of 2005 until 
1st semester of 2008. P-values based on White robust standard-errors in parentheses.
    *, **, *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
(Continued)
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Table 3 - Instructors’ Ranking: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals
Ranking 1 - Benchmark 
Instructor Lower Bound Point Estimate Upper Bound
1 3.52 3.65 3.79
2 3.45 3.64 3.83
3 3.51 3.64 3.77
4 3.46 3.63 3.81
5 3.42 3.61 3.80
6 3.46 3.59 3.72
7 3.36 3.53 3.69
8 3.32 3.52 3.71
9 3.37 3.50 3.64
10 3.23 3.49 3.74
11 3.33 3.48 3.63
12 3.31 3.48 3.66
13 3.32 3.45 3.59
14 3.26 3.44 3.63
15 3.27 3.44 3.61
16 3.32 3.43 3.54
17 3.25 3.43 3.61
18 3.31 3.42 3.54
19 3.27 3.42 3.57
20 3.24 3.41 3.58
21 3.29 3.41 3.53
22 3.21 3.40 3.59
23 3.28 3.40 3.52
24 3.23 3.39 3.55
25 3.23 3.38 3.53
26 3.21 3.37 3.54
27 3.22 3.37 3.51
28 3.21 3.37 3.52
29 3.22 3.37 3.51
30 3.17 3.36 3.55
31 3.17 3.35 3.53
32 3.17 3.33 3.49
33 3.20 3.33 3.46
34 3.16 3.33 3.49
35 3.18 3.32 3.47
36 3.15 3.32 3.49
37 3.16 3.32 3.47
38 3.18 3.31 3.44
39 3.18 3.31 3.44
40 3.17 3.31 3.45
41 3.13 3.30 3.48
42 3.18 3.30 3.42
43 3.17 3.29 3.41
44 3.05 3.25 3.45
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Ranking 1 - Benchmark 
Instructor Lower Bound Point Estimate Upper Bound
45 3.10 3.24 3.37
46 3.06 3.22 3.39
47 3.05 3.21 3.36
48 3.07 3.20 3.34
49 3.03 3.20 3.36
50 3.04 3.19 3.34
51 2.99 3.19 3.38
52 3.03 3.18 3.33
53 3.08 3.18 3.28
54 3.01 3.16 3.32
55 3.00 3.16 3.32
56 3.00 3.15 3.31
57 2.97 3.13 3.29
58 2.92 3.12 3.33
59 2.89 3.12 3.35
60 2.93 3.10 3.27
61 2.82 3.08 3.35
62 2.82 3.02 3.22
63 2.82 3.02 3.22
64 2.83 3.01 3.19
65 2.85 3.00 3.15
66 2.81 2.96 3.11
67 2.67 2.87 3.07
68 2.67 2.85 3.03
69 2.43 2.61 2.78
Table 4 - Adjusted Rankings: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals
Ranking 2: Control by GRADE Ranking 3: control by CSIZE and EXP
Instructor Lower Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound Instructor
Lower 
Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound
3 3.52 3.64 3.77 1 3.54 3.68 3.82
2 3.45 3.64 3.83 3 3.53 3.66 3.79
1 3.49 3.63 3.76 2 3.42 3.61 3.80
4 3.45 3.62 3.79 4 3.42 3.59 3.76
5 3.42 3.61 3.79 5 3.40 3.59 3.78
6 3.46 3.58 3.71 6 3.44 3.57 3.71
7 3.35 3.52 3.68 7 3.42 3.57 3.72
9 3.38 3.52 3.65 8 3.37 3.56 3.74
12 3.35 3.51 3.67 11 3.41 3.55 3.69
8 3.30 3.49 3.68 9 3.35 3.49 3.63
11 3.32 3.47 3.62 14 3.27 3.46 3.65
(Continued)
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Ranking 2: Control by GRADE Ranking 3: control by CSIZE and EXP
Instructor Lower Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound Instructor
Lower 
Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound
13 3.31 3.45 3.59 19 3.29 3.45 3.62
10 3.20 3.45 3.69 12 3.28 3.45 3.63
15 3.27 3.44 3.61 13 3.31 3.44 3.58
16 3.32 3.43 3.54 10 3.19 3.44 3.69
21 3.32 3.42 3.53 18 3.32 3.44 3.56
18 3.31 3.42 3.54 31 3.27 3.43 3.60
20 3.26 3.42 3.59 26 3.26 3.43 3.61
14 3.23 3.41 3.60 29 3.28 3.43 3.58
17 3.23 3.41 3.58 30 3.22 3.42 3.62
22 3.21 3.40 3.59 25 3.26 3.42 3.58
19 3.25 3.40 3.55 16 3.30 3.42 3.54
23 3.28 3.39 3.51 15 3.24 3.42 3.60
25 3.24 3.38 3.53 36 3.26 3.40 3.55
29 3.24 3.38 3.52 21 3.28 3.40 3.53
24 3.23 3.38 3.53 17 3.21 3.39 3.57
31 3.19 3.37 3.54 40 3.24 3.38 3.52
28 3.20 3.36 3.52 20 3.18 3.38 3.58
27 3.21 3.36 3.50 22 3.18 3.38 3.58
34 3.18 3.35 3.53 23 3.26 3.38 3.50
30 3.16 3.35 3.54 24 3.21 3.36 3.52
26 3.19 3.35 3.50 27 3.20 3.35 3.50
33 3.21 3.34 3.46 35 3.20 3.34 3.49
35 3.20 3.33 3.47 28 3.17 3.34 3.52
32 3.17 3.33 3.49 37 3.17 3.33 3.50
37 3.18 3.33 3.48 32 3.15 3.32 3.50
39 3.20 3.32 3.44 33 3.18 3.32 3.45
38 3.19 3.32 3.45 41 3.13 3.31 3.50
40 3.16 3.30 3.44 42 3.18 3.31 3.44
43 3.18 3.29 3.41 38 3.18 3.31 3.44
36 3.11 3.29 3.47 45 3.17 3.31 3.44
42 3.18 3.29 3.41 39 3.17 3.30 3.44
41 3.12 3.28 3.45 43 3.16 3.28 3.40
44 3.03 3.24 3.44 46 3.09 3.27 3.44
45 3.09 3.23 3.36 51 3.11 3.26 3.42
46 3.06 3.22 3.39 44 3.07 3.26 3.45
48 3.08 3.21 3.34 50 3.11 3.26 3.40
49 3.04 3.21 3.37 54 3.11 3.25 3.39
47 3.04 3.20 3.36 55 3.06 3.23 3.40
50 3.05 3.20 3.34 48 3.08 3.22 3.36
59 2.91 3.19 3.46 52 3.05 3.19 3.34
52 3.04 3.18 3.33 57 3.02 3.19 3.36
53 3.08 3.18 3.29 49 3.02 3.19 3.36
55 3.02 3.18 3.34 47 3.02 3.19 3.36
(Continued)
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Ranking 2: Control by GRADE Ranking 3: control by CSIZE and EXP
Instructor Lower Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound Instructor
Lower 
Bound
Point 
Estimate
Upper 
Bound
54 3.01 3.17 3.32 34 3.02 3.18 3.33
51 2.96 3.16 3.36 53 3.06 3.17 3.28
56 2.98 3.14 3.29 56 3.00 3.17 3.34
58 2.92 3.12 3.32 58 2.98 3.16 3.34
57 2.95 3.11 3.27 61 2.93 3.15 3.37
60 2.91 3.08 3.25 60 2.91 3.09 3.26
61 2.79 3.06 3.32 65 2.89 3.05 3.20
62 2.84 3.04 3.24 64 2.87 3.04 3.21
64 2.84 3.01 3.19 66 2.88 3.03 3.17
65 2.85 3.00 3.15 63 2.81 3.01 3.21
63 2.80 3.00 3.20 62 2.77 2.99 3.21
66 2.80 2.95 3.11 68 2.73 2.92 3.11
67 2.68 2.88 3.07 67 2.73 2.92 3.11
68 2.70 2.87 3.04 59 2.37 2.88 3.40
69 2.46 2.62 2.78 69 2.48 2.65 2.82
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